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must be left open to judicial inquiry based on reasonableness. Such an approach
has been outlined by the Supreme Court in its McLaughlin opinion.
John Liebert
John Lewis*
* Members, Second Year Class.
THE FREEZING CONCEPT AND VOTER QUALIFICATIONS
Freezing is a new concept, with origins in time-proven legal doctrines. It
extends beyond the narrow realm of voter registration into other areas where
states have made unconstitutional racial classifications that must now be rectified.
Nevertheless this discussion is limited to its application in the voter registration
field. Freezing has two different and very distinct meanings. In one sense freezing
is used to describe the effect of past discrimination coupled with new burdensome
registration requirements in voter registration. In the other sense the term is
used to depict the legal remedy applied to undo the results of past discrimination
in voter registration.
The first meaning of freezing is exemplified where Negroes have been dis-
criminated against in voter registration, so that in a given area most whites and
very few Negroes are registered. The courts put an end to such discrimination,
but before the Negroes can register the state adopts a new, though nondiscrimina-
tory, registration requirement. In effect the new requirement freezes the priv-
ileged status of the whites, gained during a discriminatory period, and freezes
out the group discriminated against.' This first type of freezing will be called
discriminatory freezing.
The second and more important meaning of freezing, which will be called
remedial freezing, is "the keeping in effect, at least temporarily, those require-
ments for qualification to vote, which were in effect, to the benefit of others,
at the time the Negroes were being discriminated against."2 In other words,
it is the freezing of registration standards that were actually in effect when the
great majority of white citizens were registered. A simple illustration of how
this concept works is a situation where there are certain statutory requirements
for voter qualification, such as reading a section of the state constitution and
filling out a detailed application. Whenever white citizens appear to register
the registrar disregards the statutory requirements of literacy and merely asks
for the applicants" name, age, and address. When Negroes come to register, the
registrar gives them a difficult section of the state constitution to read, and fre-
quently finds technical errors in their answers so as to disqualify them. Invoking
remedial freezing, the court would determine -the actual standards as applied
to whites, i.e., name, age, and address, and would order the registrar, at least tem-
porarily, to apply the same standards to Negroes regardless of what the statutory
1 United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, 837 (5th Cir. 1964).
2 United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 769 (5th Cir. 1964).
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requirements prescribed.3 Remedial freezing has also been applied in recent
cases to enjoin the enforcement of any new burdensome statutory registration
requirements that have been adopted since the discriminatory period during
which most whites were registered. 4 The adoption of a new burdensome, though
constitutional, requirement which most whites did not have to face is an example
of discriminatory freezing. Since remedial freezing is the application of actual
white standards to the Negro, the application of remedial freezing necessarily
requires enjoining the enforcement of any new burdensome requirements as well
as of any old requirements not previously applied to whites.
The Growth of the Freezing Concept
Freezing has its basis in two famous and closely related cases extensively
quoted and cited in all recent cases dealing with the concept. In Guinn v. United
States5 the Supreme Court held invalid an amendment to the Oklahoma consti-
tution which established literacy requirements for electors and which also con-
tained a grandfather clause. The grandfather clause exempted from the literacy
test all lineal descendants of persons entitled to vote on or before January 1,
1866, under any form of government, or residing in a foreign nation at that
time. The Court held that since the Negroes had no eligibility before that date,
the amendment was invalid "as it necessarily recreates and perpetuates the very
conditions which the Fifteenth Amendment was intended to destroy."6 After
this decision, Oklahoma passed another statute in 1916 requiring all citizens
then qualified to vote to register within a twelve-day period or be forever disen-
franchised.
In Lane v. Wilson,7 the Supreme Court concluded that in effect this new
requirement gave the Negroes only twelve days to re-assert constitutional rights
which had been denied them twenty-five years before. The Court decided that
twelve days was inadequate and held the statute invalid under the fifteenth
amendment.
Obviously the Lane case is an example of an extreme attempt by the Okla-
homa legislature to discriminatorily freeze the privileged status the whites gained
during the period of discrimination prior to Guinn by the imposition of another
burdensome statute before the disadvantaged Negroes had a chance to enjoy
the rights secured by Guinn. Since the new statute was unconstitutional and
the grandfather clause under Guinn was also void, the Court achieved the same
end as recent decisions which have invoked remedial freezing.
Cases Invoking the Freezing Concept
The cases invoking the concept of freezing since 1960 have done so in part
in reliance on the 1960 Civil Rights Act.a This is a result of the interpretation
of that act in Alabama v. United States.9
8 See Id.
4id.
5238 U.S. 347 (1915).
6 Id. at 360.
7307 U.S. 268 (1939).
874 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 (U.S.C.), amend-
ing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 837, 1074, 1509; 20 U.S.C. §§ 241, 640; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974(a)-
(e), 1975(d) (Supp. V, 1964).
9 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962).
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The 1960 Civil Rights Act set up the voting referee procedure,10 whereby
referees appointed by the court determine whether Negroes discriminated against
pursuant to a pattern or practice are "qualified under state law." 1 If qualified,
they are issued a certificate allowing them to vote. Accordingly, the court in
Alabama ordered registration of sixty-four qualified Negroes.12 In interpreting
the act, the court held that Congress had expanded the federal courts' power
in this area by allowing the courts to use the traditional tools of equity. Thus a
step toward remedial freezing was taken by providing the power to enjoin the
use of voting requirements which tended to discriminatorily freeze the preferred
status of the whites, but which were not violative of the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendments.
The first decision to actually invoke remedial freezing was United States v.
Fenton.'3 The Federal District Court found that the board of registrars had dis-
criminated against Negroes by following certain procedures which had the effect
of setting stricter requirements for Negro registration than for white registration.
For example, the registrars would flunk Negro applicants for minor and technical
errors in filling out their questionnaires, while white applicants were passed
after making the same errors. Also, the registrars helped white applicants fill
out the more obscure parts of the questionnaire, while Negroes were given no
aid at all. The court concluded that such discrimination was obviously illegal
under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Consequently, in an effort to
do equity, the court used the equitable powers given it by the 1960 Civil Rights
Act and directed that certain qualified Negroes be registered, enjoined any
further discriminatory practices, and ordered the same standard which had ac-
tually been applied to whites in the past to be applied to all future applicants.
The court found none of the statutory requirements for voter registration un-
constitutional.
The clearest illustration of freezing in both its aspects is United States v.
Duke.14 Evidence supported the court's finding of a pattern and practice of
discrimination against Negroes in voter registration which existed in 1955 and
subsequently. As a result of this discrimination most qualified whites in Panola
County, Mississippi, were registered voters, while only two Negroes were regis-
tered in a county whose population is about equally divided between the two
races. In 1960 and 1962 the legislature added new requirements such as "good
moral character" and a "challenge procedure" which allowed a registered voter
to challenge the good moral character of any applicant. Prior to these new re-
1074 Stat. 90 (1960) (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
11 "Qualified under state law shall mean qualified according to the laws, customs,
or usages of the state, and shall not, in any event, imply qualifications more stringent
than those used ... in qualifying persons, other than those of the race or color against
which the pattern or practice of discrimination was found to exist." 74 Stat. 92 (1960)
(Title VI), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
12 The freezing cases have not followed the exact referee procedure. Rather than
appoint a referee, the courts have ordered the county registrars to register Negroes
previously discriminated against, using the same standards applied to whites during
the discriminatory period. In other words, the courts used the test set forth in the 1960
Civil Rights Act for "qualified under state law."
1S212 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
14332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).
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quirements, the Mississippi statutory requirements for registration entailed being
able to read, write, and interpret reasonably any section of the Mississippi
constitution.' 5 The actual standards applied -to whites were far less stringent
than called for by the statutes-practically nothing more than signing the list.
Negroes were held to strict compliance with the statutes and almost always
failed to pass. Since Negroes had been discriminated against under the old
standards prior to 1962, the court concluded that the adding of the new regis-
tration requirements in 1960 and 1962, even though further discrimination had
been enjoined and hopefully eliminated, had had the effect of discriminatorily
freezing the whites' status. The court enjoined the further use of the new re-
quirements. It decided that an appropriate remedy should undo the results of
past discrimination as well as prevent future discrimination. Therefore it ap-
plied remedial freezing and ordered the Panola County registrar to apply to
Negroes eligible to vote before 1962 the same standards as were actually ap-
plied to whites during the discriminatory period. Consequently the court also
enjoined use of the interpretation test.
In 1965 the Supreme Court stated that "the court has not merely the power
but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the dis-
criminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future."' 6
With these words the Court, in Louisiana v. United States, '7 affirmed the deci-
sion of the Federal District Court which applied remedial freezing.' 8 There the
court had struck down as unconstitutional Louisiana's law which required an
"understanding and interpretation" of a clause of the state or federal constitution.
The court also enjoined -the use of a new citizenship test as a requirement for
voter registration without declaring it unconstitutional.' 9 The court concluded
that the understanding and interpretation requirement was unconstitutional be-
cause it gave arbitrary powers to the registrar and was too subjective. Eliminating
the unconstitutional requirements was not enough. The court held that use
of the new citizenship test must be enjoined in order to minimize the discrimina-
tory freezing effect. Thus the court retained for the Negroes the same standards
as had actually been applied to the whites.
The new citizenship test has not been held unconstitutional and was not
considered so in Louisiana.20 Therefore it appears that the application of remedial
freezing in Louisiana, as in other freezing cases, is in effect an alteration of
'5 In Duke the court treated the interpretation test as being constitutional. But
in a subsequent decision the Supreme Court held this same type of interpretation test
unconstitutional under the fifteenth amendment. The Supreme Court also affirmed the
lower court's application of remedial freezing in regard to other registration require-
ments. The Court enjoined the further use of a citizenship test until Negroes previously
discriminated against had a chance to register under the same standards as applied to
whites. Louisiana v. United States, CCH Sup. CT. BuLL. '1101 (March 8, 1965),
affirming, United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).
16 Id. at 1108.
17 Id.
IsUnited States v. La., 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).




constitutional state standards regarding voter qualifications. This raises a grave
constitutional question not -considered in the Supreme Court's decision.
Violation of States' Rights to Prescribe Voting Requirements
The power of the states to define the qualifications of voters is practically
unlimited,21 subject only to the restrictions in the United States Constitution.
22
This power applies not only to local elections,
23 but also to presidential elections.
24
The basic right of suffrage is not conferred by the United States Constitution,
but, generally speaking, is derived from the states under state constitutions.2 5
Although the right to vote for congressmen and senators is indirectly derived
from the Constitution,26 the Constitution gives Congress no power to prescribe the
qualifications of electors in the states.
27
The application of remedial freezing would appear to be violative of this
state right, to prescribe voter qualifications. Enjoining the application of valid
state statutes and requiring the application of standards less stringent is surely
an alteration of voter qualifications. The voting procedure under the 1960 Civil
Rights Act, as applied, also appears to be an alteration of voting requirements
as set out by the state legislature. Nevertheless, this procedure has been held
constitutional several times by Federal District Courts.28 One court stated that
the referee plan was proper legislation regarding the manner of holding elec-
tions and did not affect voter qualifications, but rather was concerned only with
those who were denied the right to vote though "qualified under state law."29
This argument would seem to ignore the definition that Congress has given to
the term "qualified under state law."80 If the Negro applicant meets the qualifi-
cations which were previously applied to whites, the referee is directed to issue
a voting certificate to him. Since this procedure directs registration of persons
whose qualifications are below those now prescribed by state statute, it appears
to be an alteration of voter qualifications.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has now approved of the use of freezing
21Accord, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937); Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 623 (1904); United States,
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-556 (1875).
2 2 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV.
2
3 See State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383 (1893).
2 4 See In re Opinion of Justices, 118 Me. 544, 107 A. 705 (1919).
25 See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Mason v. Mo. 179 U.S. 328,
335 (1900); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1875).
2 6 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-315 (1941); Pope v. Williams,
supra note 24 at 633.
2 7 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921); Smith v. Blackwell, 34
F. Supp. 989, 993-94 (E.D. S.C.), affirmed, 115 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1940). See
generally triz, CoNGREss IoAL PowmR Ovmn Vorun QuALFc~AmoNs, 49 A.B.A.J. 949
(1963).
2 8See United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963); United States
v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Alabama, 188 F. Supp.
759, 762 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
2 9 See United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 284-87 (W.D. La. 1963).
See generally Note, 72 YA.E L.J. 770 (1963).3 0 See note 11 supra.
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